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RETURN OF THE EARNEST MONEY IS NOT A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT TO FILING SUIT 
Defendant now argues that the return the earnest money is a condition precedent to 
filing suit and that failure to do so prohibits this claim. Defendant has not raised the 
condition precedent argument until nowr. It is being raised for the first time on appeal. 
Because the argument was raised for the first time on appeal, it should not be heard by 
this court. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
1983). 
Even if this court were to consider the ''condition precedent argument." that 
argument is not sound. While it is true that conditions precedent can be created by 
agreement between the parties, "conditions are not favored and [] where doubt exists, 
they will not be presumed." 1A C.J.S., Actions, §46. 
Appellees cite no cases to support their bold proposition that return of the earnest 
money is a condition precedent to seeking legal or equitable relief. Instead, appellee 
relies entirely upon the contract language. In this case, the agreement between the parties 
does not require return of the earnest money prior to filing suit. As explained in the 
appellant's brief, the contract simply requires return of the earnest money prior to 
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judgment. That is especially true Under our legal system in which inconsistent pleadings 
are allowed and conditions precedent are not favored by the courts. 
At the trial level, the appelllpes argued that failure to return the earnest money was 
an irrevocable election of remedies. They appear to have completely abandoned that 
argument and now urge this court to rely upon a new legal theory. As stated in the 
appellants' opening brief, the election of remedy analyses relied upon in the earlier 
earnest money cases does not warrant dismissal of this case. 
Defendants do not argue that! any public policy favors the strict rule they are 
pressing this court to adopt, nor do they dispute the public policy arguments raised by the 
appellants and which support allowing a seller to return the earnest money after filing 
suit. 
II. 
THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE!TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY WAS 
WAIVED 
A. THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY MAY 
BE WAIVED. 
The defendants cite no cases or authority for the proposition that the defense of 
failure to return the earnest money cannot be waived. Because the defense was created by 
agreement between the parties, it only makes sense that the parties can agree to waive it. 
As stated previously, this court should) not consider the "condition precedent argument' 
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asserted by the defendants. If this court were to consider that argument however, that 
would not prevent the defendants from waiving the defense. Conditions precedent may 
be waived. 1 A, C J.S., Actions, §46 ("where the conditions are such that they do not 
prevent the accrual of the right, but operate merely on the remedy, performance thereof 
may be waived by defendant"). In this case, the condition precedent asserted by the 
defendants speak solely to the remedy. Failure to return the earnest money does not 
impact upon the formation or performance of the essential elements of the real estate 
purchase contract. Instead, failure to return the earnest money impacts solely upon the 
remedy available. Thus, it can be waived. 
B. THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF THE RETURN OF THE 
EARNEST MONEY. 
Defendants dispute the factual findings made by the trial court judge. Specifically, 
they claim that the trial court judge incorrectly held that they failed to raise the return of 
the earnest money in their answer and that they stipulated to waive the defense. An 
appellee may not seek to modify the decision or judgment below unless the appellee files 
a timely cross appeal. Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.4 (Utah App. 1987). In this 
case, the defendants did not file a timely cross appeal and their cross appeal has been 
accordingly dismissed. If this court were to determine that the issue is properly before it, 
this court should reject the argument on several other grounds. 
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The defendants claim that jthey raised the defense in their answer. The closest 
thing to raising the defense in their answer is the Fourth Defense which reserved the right 
to raise additional affirmative defenses they learned of during the discovery process. 
Such a statement is insufficient to Iraise an affirmative defense and the trial court properly 
found that the defense was not raised in the answer. 
The defendants failed to preserve for appeal their argument that they didn't 
stipulate to waive the defense. On pages 18 and 19 of their brief, the defendants quote an 
exchange before the trial court judge and counsel for the defendants. The exchange can 
be found in the Record at R. 516, page 11. In the exchange, the trial court judge asks Mr. 
Bradford if he was claiming that the defendants had not stipulated to waive the defense. 
The trial court judge indicated that he intended to hold an evidentiary hearing if that was 
at issue. Counsel for the defendants stated that he was simply resting his argument on 
whether the defense could be waivecjl. Relying upon that, the trial court judge entered his 
findings without holding an evidentiary hearing.1 
1
 THE COURT: If that's true, then, if there's some ambiguity then I would need to have a 
hearing. But if you're not resting on some ambiguity, you're basically saying you can't waive it." 
MR. BRADFORD: That's right, and that is what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: So that's why I'm saying I don't want to mince words. If we're going to 
talk about it some other way, I mean, Mil 
MR. BRADFORD: Whatever the agreement was, whatever the conversation was - and I 
wasn't there - and whatever the letter sa^s, and however Mr. Abbott intended it, my position is it 
was not waivable after the fact. 
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Further, the defendants are required to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's decision. U.R.A.P. 24(9). The defendants have failed to do so. For that reason, 
their argument should not be heard. 
Finally, the evidence before the trial court clearly showed that the defendants 
stipulated to waive the defense. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY RETURNING THE 
EARNEST MONEY TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
Defendants dispute the return of the earnest money to the plaintiffs. An appellee 
may not seek to modify the decision or judgment below unless the appellee files a timely 
cross appeal. Halladav v. Cluff 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.4 (Utah App. 1987). In this case, 
the defendants did not file a timely cross appeal and their cross appeal has been 
accordingly dismissed. If this court were to determine that the issue is properly before it, 
this court should reject the argument on several other grounds. 
The defendants argue that the court should not have returned the earnest money 
because they did not breach the contract. Unfortunately, the defendants made a motion to 
dismiss the case at the close of the plaintiffs' case. Thus, the trial court never had an 
opportunity to make a decision on the merits. The defendants now complain that the trial 
court should have reached a decision on the merits. The defendants created the problem 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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of which they now complain. Thiy are the ones who requested the trial court judge to 
abort the trial and dismiss the case without reaching the merits. They cannot now claim 
harm because of the situation theyl created. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY REDUCING THE 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
Defendants dispute the return of the earnest money to the plaintiffs. An appellee 
may not seek to modify the decision or judgment below unless the appellee files a timely 
cross appeal. Halladav v. Cluff. 73^ P.2d 643, 645 n.4 (Utah App. 1987). In this case, 
the defendants did not file a timely iross appeal and their cross appeal has been 
accordingly dismissed. If this court were to determine that the issue is properly before it. 
this court should reject the argument on several other srounds. 
The defendants argue that they deliberately failed to raise the defense of failure to 
return the earnest money so that they could obtain a dismissal with prejudice. Only after 
the plaintiffs rested and they believeq they could obtain a dismissal with prejudice did 
they raise the defense. 
The contract states that the prevailing party shall be awarded a reasonable 
attorneys fee. The fee sought by defense counsel was not reasonable, because the 
litigation strategy pursued by defense counsel was not appropriate. Attorneys have a duty 
to expedite litigation. Further, they hajve a duty not to mislead others involved in 
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litigation. By holding his defense in his back pocket until after the plaintiffs rested, 
defense counsel wasted his time, opposing counsel's time and the court's time. Further 
by stipulating to waive the defense while harboring a strategy to raise it at a later date, 
defense counsel mislead opposing counsel. The defense strategy was not appropriate or 
reasonable and thus no fee should have been awarded for pursuing it. 
Finally, defendants do not dispute that the trial court erred by dismissing the case 
with prejudice. Because the trial court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice, the 
basis behind the defense strategy was erroneous. Thus, no fee should have been awarded 
for pursuing that strategy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the appellants (plaintiffs) respectfully request this 
Court to overturn the order of the trial court dated November 25, 2000 and to remand this 
case to the trial court with instructions that the trial court deny the motion to dismiss and 
hear this case on its merits. Further, the appellants request their costs on appeal. 
DATED this 11th day of August, 2001. 
Nelson Abbott 
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